The Existence of God Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 1

The Existence of God - Essay Example When he does buy it that is not God answering your prayer, but just coincidence. My remarks surprised you because you are a staunch believer in God. You rejected my argument, terming it logically fallacious, saying there is a supreme being that controls our existence and nature. You continued to say that everything that happens does so for a reason, and the reason is God. That was brilliant and so enlightening. Introducing the fallacies of the appeal of faith, I stated that if you do not have faith you could not learn about God and His mysteries. Faith relies on belief and does not base on any evidence, depends on irrationalism in thinking. This implies that, if you do not believe in God, then you surely cannot learn about him. I am not a believer but know little about God, because I believe knowing about Him is not necessarily about faith but interest in learning. You could not agree with me at all from the beginning. Your response was that one has to have faith in God, to understand how mysterious He is, and termed my argument logically fallacious. Also, dismissed my argument saying that you cannot learn about something you do not believe in at all. That was a smart argument and really got me thinking. This was a revelation to me. I also brought forward the fallacy on begging the question or assuming the answer to certain problems in the society. Many people believe that spreading religion among more people in society will instill moral behavior. I did not understand how praise and worship could instill moral behavior in the society, rather than teaching moral behavior and personal choice of people. Being a believer, you explained that from God’s teachings Christians are encouraged to have good moral behaviors. Therefore, spreading religion to more members of society, to have more believers, there will be a change of morality in society. This was a truly factual argument. Receive my

INndividual Assignment 5 Article Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

INndividual Assignment 5 - Article Example Products and services can be spread to others through status posts and pictures, thus the advertising companies get the benefit of passive advertising at a very low cost (88). For example, in the global social networking website Facebook, large companies took the advantage of both interacting with their consumers as well as getting their feedback and photos of the product to gain a wider range of audience. The more people â€Å"like† their pages, it is correlated with many people becoming more aware of their products, which spells as a success in their advertising campaign in Facebook. Using this network in advertising products can be an effective strategy in the promotion of new products and showcasing best-selling items to others, which is why many companies were already on this bandwagon of advertising by making their own product page known among network users. Many companies created their own pages in the social networking giant, and a blog post in 2010 shows which companies and products gained the most number of â€Å"likes† among its users (Porterfield). The blog explains the successful marketing strategies of the top 10 Facebook product pages, two of which, Red Bull Page (ranked number 1) and The Twilight Saga Page (ranked number 9) would be discussed here. First is how Red Bull was able to gain top rank in 2010 for number of â€Å"likes†, which was accomplished by numerous interactive links in the page such as games and video-uploads, as well as the use of attention-grabbing images for fans to â€Å"like† their page (Porterfield). The company did not use too many texts, but rather focused on creative advertising so as to grab the attention of social networking users. Because Red Bull removed the complexities of too much reading and instead used interactive and creative strategies of gaining the interest of interne t citizens, they were able to gain many fans and rank number one in the list. Red Bull as an energy beverage is not a

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism What choice for Europe? Reflections on agency and structure in Liberal Intergovernmentalism ABSTRACT This article examines how the relationship between agency and structure is dealt with in Liberal Intergovernmentalism, a prevailing theory of European integration. It demonstrates that, contrary to the widespread view that it is agency-centred, Liberal Intergovernmentalism is in fact a highly structuralist theory in the issue areas it claims to explain best. In these areas integration is ultimately explained in terms of developments in economic structures, leaving no room for agency and ideas. The article also shows that, despite the importance it ascribes to changes in economic structures, Liberal Intergovernmentalism fails to theorise their possible causes. Keywords: Liberal Intergovernmentalism; Moravcsik; Agency; Structure; Integration theory Over the past two decades Andrew Moravcsiks Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) has established itself as one of the prevailing theories of European integration. Elegantly combining a liberal theory of preference formation with an intergovernmentalist theory of interstate bargains and a functional theory of institutional choice it explains European integration as the outcome of a series of intergovernmental negotiations. More than any other contemporary theory of integration LI and its application in empirical analyses has provoked discussion in the field of EU studies. Opinions are divided between those who admire LI for its parsimony and predictive power and those who feel that its account of regional integration misses out on too much of importance. Either way, hardly anyone would dispute that it continues to be a theory that it is necessary to relate to in one way or another in theoretically informed work on European integration. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of integration from a meta-theoretical perspective. More precisely, it will be systematically analysed how the relationship between agency and structure is dealt with in LI. Any theorys account of the social world, or delimited parts of it, is based on a particular, albeit often implicit, conceptualisation of the agency-structure relationship and whether or not this conceptualisation is convincing impacts greatly on the quality of the theorys account of social phenomena and change. There is thus much to be learned about a theory, in this case LI, from examining its underlying assumptions with respect to agency and structure. This is even more so because appearances can be deceiving: as it will be argued in this article, LI which appears and is widely assumed to offer an agency-centred account of European integration, turns out to do the opposite on closer scrutiny. In addition to this introduction and a conclusion the article is divided into seven sections. The first two sections set the stage for later analyses by briefly introducing LI and the question of the agency-structure relationship, while also accounting for their respective significance. The following three sections examine how the agency-structure question is dealt with at each of the three stages of LI: preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. Against this background section six critically examines the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of European integration before section seven discusses the political implications of LI. 1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism Andrew Moravcsiks Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) was first presented in the early 1990s and later elaborated and applied in a string of publications of which the monumental book The Choice for Europe (1998) contains the most detailed exposition and test of the theory. LI is presented as a framework for synthesising theories into a coherent account of regional integration. The latter is explained as the result of ‘a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains (Moravcsik, 1993: 473). More precisely integration is seen as the outcome of a three-stage process where: (1) national interests or goals arise in the context of domestic politics; (2) governments bargain with each other to further their national interest; and (3) governments make an institutional choice to secure credible commitment once a substantive agreement has been reached. LI quickly became a focal point in debates on how to theorise European integration and it has subsequently kept this position. According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 67), LI ‘has acquired the status of a â€Å"baseline theory† in the study of regional integration: an essential first cut explanation against which other theories are often compared. In their view, ‘it has achieved this dominant status due to its theoretical soundness, empirical power, and utility as a foundation for synthesis with other explanations (2009: 67). To be sure, not everyone would agree with this latter sentiment. As alluded to in the introduction, several scholars have criticised the theory for painting a too incomplete or even misleading picture of the European integration process and the ‘empirical power of the resulting analyses has often been questioned (e.g. Diez, 1999; Smith, 2000; Wincott, 1995; see also Cini, 2007: 112-14 for an overview of some critiques of LI). In asmuch as relatively few scholars besides Moravcsik appear to wholeheartedly embrace LI (Pollack, 2001; however, cf. Laursen, 2002), it is probably fair to say that it has acquired its status as a â€Å"baseline theory† as much because of its perceived weaknesses as because of its strengths. Similar to Waltzs (1979) neorealism LI is a parsimonious and bold theory that lends itself to accusations of neglecting or underestimating the significance of important parameters in the case of LI for instance transnational business groups and activist supranational institutions. Indeed, LI does this deliberately, seeking ‘to simplify EU politics, stressing the essential and excluding certain secondary activities (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68). Hereby it follows the neo-positivist recipe for theory construction, according to which theories should take the form of simplified models that can support efforts to make generalisations by singling out as few variables as possible and account for the causal relations between, and the relative weight of, these variables. Falsifiable hypothesises are derived from such theories and subsequently tested against reliable empirical data. On the basis of such tests, theories can then be further refined or occasionally discarded. (1 ) Testing LI is precisely what Moravcsik sets out to do in The Choice for Europe. Here standardised hypotheses derived from LI and competing (albeit for the most part artificial) theories are tested against an overwhelming amount of empirical data in five cases studies. Needless to say, LI comes out on top as the theory with the by far greatest explanatory power. More generally, The Choice for Europe constitutes an example par excellence of research informed by neo-positivist methods and standards. In its early pages Moravcsik informs his readership that the book ‘eschews ad hoc explanation and seeks instead to discover what is generalizable about EC history (1998: 2) and that it ‘is based on methods which, while far from ideal, generate more rigorous, transparent, objective, and reliable tests of competing theoretical claims about European integration than have heretofore been conducted (1998: 10). The bulk of studies of EC decision-making are criticised for biased data se lection and for relying on ‘citations to secondary sources themselves drawn from journalistic commentary or still other secondary sources (1998: 10). In contrast to this, Moravcsik claims to have backed ‘potentially controversial attribution of motive or strategy †¦ by â€Å"hard† primary sources (direct evidence of decision-making) rather than â€Å"soft† or secondary sources (1998: 10, see also pp. 80-84). (2) 2. Agency and structure The question of how to conceptualise the relationship between agency and structure is arguably one of the most important questions facing social scientists (Archer, 1995: 65). This is due to the importance of agency and structures in the social world and to the fact that it is impossible to offer explanations of events in the social world without appealing to some understanding of their relationship. As mentioned in the introduction there is thus much to be learned about the nature and quality of substantive theories from examining their underlying assumptions with respect to this relationship. Yet the way the latter is dealt with is also important for political reasons, to which we will come back in section 7 below. â€Å"Agency† denotes the ability of agents, whether individuals or groups, to act upon situations and it ‘implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy that the actor could have behaved differently (Hay, 2002: 94). Agency should thus not be confused wit h concepts like â€Å"individuals†, â€Å"actors† or â€Å"agents†: without anticipating the conclusions of this article too much, a theory can refer to plenty of agents, while not allowing for any agency. â€Å"Structure†, on the other hand, refers to the relational context within which agents operate. Structures define the range of options available to agents. Nowadays the vast majority of scholars agree that both agency and structure matter: phenomena and developments in the social world issue not from either one or the other but are a product of both. If this is the case then it is necessary to break with the two ways of conceptualising the relation between agency and structure that have traditionally been dominant within social theory, namely structuralism and individualism. In their pure versions these positions either picture agents as marionettes (structuralism) or as omnipotent puppet-masters (individualism) (Archer, 1995; XXXXX). However, knowing that both agency and structure matter does not in itself take us far. To make a difference the insight needs to be incorporated into substantive theories and this is by no means an easy task. This contributes to explain why many theories end up offering reductionist explanations of the specific social phenomena they are meant to render intelligible. In the discipline of International Relations (IR) a debate over the â€Å"agent-structure problem† was initiated in the late 1980s by scholars such as Wendt (1987) and Hollis and Smith (1990). Later, and certainly no less interesting contributions to this debate included Doty (1997), Bieler and Morton (2001) and Wight (2006). The debate has done much to clarify and in many cases criticise the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying mainstream IR theories, particularly Waltzian neorealism (Waltz, 1979). In EU Studies a similar debate has not taken place, and although in particular some constructivist scholars, have taken an interest in the agency-structure relationship (e.g. Wind, 2001), a comprehensive study of the way the most important theories of European integration and governance deal with it has yet to be published. However, it seems to be a widespread view among EU scholars that many of these theories privilege agency over structure. For instance, Risse ( 2004: 161) writes that the ‘prevailing theories of European integration whether neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or â€Å"multi-level governance† are firmly committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centred by definition. In a similar vein, other scholars have noticed ‘the ahistorical and structure-blind assumptions underlying intergovernmentalism (Hix, 1994: 9) and observed that in LI ‘agents are, implicitly or explicitly, considered primary actors ultimately determine the shape of overall structures (Christiansen, 1998: 103). In the next sections, the validity of this widespread view will be examined through an analysis of the way the agency-structure relationship is dealt with at each of the three stages in LI. 3. National preference formation The first stage in explaining the outcome of intergovernmental bargains is to account for the national preferences, which are defined as ‘an ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes †¦ that might result from international political interaction (Moravcsik, 1998: 24). This is done by means of a liberal political economy theory of preference formation, according to which national preferences arise in the context of domestic politics, where national government leaders form them on the basis of the preferences and actions of the most important societal groups. Most important among these are domestic producers: ‘The systematic political bias in favor of existing producer groups and against those, notably consumers, taxpayers, third-country producers, and also potential future producers, stems from the formers more intense, certain, and institutionally represented and organized interests (1998: 36). The state is conceptualised as ‘a rep resentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by societal groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). Because governments have an interest in remaining in office, they need the support from coalitions of domestic actors. The policies pursued by governments are ‘therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups †¦ who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue politics consistent with their preferences (ibid: 518). In other words, ‘[g]roups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them and it is through this process that ‘the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations emerges (Moravcsik, 1993: 483). To evaluate the way the agency-structure relationship is dealt with at this stage in LI it is clearly crucial to understand the origins of the preferences of societal groups. Some of the early critics of LI suggested that the theory fails to account adequately for this. For instance, it was pointed out that ‘the origins of such interests are exogenized (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 56) while others claimed that in LI ‘interests are not structurally derived (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 44) and even that they ‘emerge mysteriously (McSweeney, 1998: 101). Had it in fact been the case that LI leaves completely open the question of where the preferences of societal groups come from it would have allowed for an agency-centred perspective on preference formation. That is, preferences could have been formed on the basis of all sorts of ideas and individual inclinations. However, this would have seriously undermined the parsimony and explanatory power of the theory and hence it was in fact never left open where preferences come from. As Moravcsik has made clear, LI perceives preferences to be directly caused by structural circumstances, more precisely economic structures: ‘I employ a structural theory of those preferences. My structural approach†¦employs trade flows, competitiveness, inflation rates, and other data to predict what the economic preferences of societal actors and therefore governments should be (Moravcsik, 1999b: 377). In other words, economic preferences are derived from economic structures: societal groups organise and articulate their preferences ‘on the basis of calculations of net expected costs and benefits resulting from the introduction of new policies (Moravcsik, 1993: 489). It follows as a logical implication that ‘shifts in preferences should follow the onset and precede the resolution of shifts or trends in economic circumstances (Moravcsik, 1998: 50). The assumption that economic structures translate directly into specific preferences is made possible by the rationality assumption underpinning LI. The widespread view that LI is agency-centred is related to this assumption that individuals, groups, governments and even states are rational. This begs the question of what â€Å"rationalism† precisely entails, especially as some scholars have suggested that Moravcsik fails to spell this clearly out (Christiansen et al., 2001: 4). In a recent piece Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 68) put it as follows: ‘Rationalism is an individualist or agency assumption. Actors calculate the alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances. Collective outcomes are explained as the result of aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit albeit subject to the information at hand and uncertainty about the future. Despite the qualifications at the end of the quote it is clear that whatever this uncertainty pertains to it is not to the consequences of the actions of agents: agents are assumed to be very well-informed about these because, as Moravcsik has put it himself, in ‘a world in which the future consequences of actions are unknown †¦ LI would make little sense (1995: 626). This is an important manifestation, because the more it is assumed that agents know the future consequences of their actions, the more it must also be assumed that they are fully informed about the context in which they currently find themselves. It is quite simply logically inconceivable that an agent can somehow know the future consequences of his or her actions without having perfect or very close to perfect information at hand at the moment of the action itself. Moravcsik is thus significantly underplaying the strength of his rationality assumption when stating that ‘it takes no position on whether states are fully informed, though a framework in which states are assumed to be informed generally performs well (1998: 23). Why not walk the plank? Surely states and other agents can safely be assumed to be blessed full information if it has already been established that no or very few unintended consequences will follow from their actions? At the end of the day the rationality assumption boils down to the view that agents are utility-maximisers with clearly ordered preferences who are (almost?) fully informed, also about the future consequences of actions. However, it should not be concluded from this that LI is an agency-centred theory as the conventional wisdom has it. As we have seen above, preferences are derived from economic structures not just in the weak sense that structures are important in relation to preferences but in the strong sense that they alone dictate preferences (albeit with a minor qualification to which we will return in a moment). Because the rational agents are assumed to be so well-informed their actions become predictable once their structural environment has been mapped. Indeed, only structures matter here inasmuch as ‘[p]references are by definition causally independent of the strategies of other actors (Moravcsik, 1997: 519, see also 1998: 24-25). Moreover, ideas are for the most part not allowed to play any role in relation to preference formation. It is worth dwelling on this for a moment. On one hand, Moravcsik does not hesitate to acknowledge the importance of ideas, as when he proclaims that they ‘are like oxygen or language; it is essentially impossible for humans to function without them (Moravcsik, 2001: 229). On the other hand, ideas do not play a very prominent role in LI, which is also recognized by Moravcsik when he writes that ‘[i]n the LI account of integration, ideas are present but not causally central. They may be irrelevant or random, or, more likely, they are â€Å"transmission belts† for interests (Moravcsik, 2001: 229). The only reason why Moravcsik can correctly maintain that in LI ‘[s]ome national preferences are grounded in ideas (1998: 23) is because some importance is ascribed to the latter in issue areas where the material consequences of policy initiatives are more or less impossible to calculate. For instance, he mentions ‘questions of European institutions and common foreign policy as issues where governments/states will generally not to be under strong pressure from societal groups to pursue particular policies, which creates some room for government leaders to act on the basis of ‘ideologies and personal commitments (Moravcsik, 1993: 494; see also Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 85). According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 76), ‘LI best explains policy-making in issue areas where social preferences are relatively certain and well defined. In the core areas, like trade, agriculture and monetary policy, ideas are not assumed to influence preference formation at all. When it comes to ‘insignificant, exceptional and speculative issues like those mentioned above or the Open Method of Coordination (ibid.: 85) where the preferences of societal groups are less clear and strong, and where the explanatory power of LI is thus recognised to be limited, ideas are conveniently allowed to play a role. To recapitulate, in LI no importance is ascribed to ideas in the explanation of what is (correctly) considered to be the ‘substantively important issues (ibid.: 85) in the European integration process: here economic structures do the job alone. (3) 4. International bargains Once the national preferences have been formulated, national decision-makers bring them to the intergovernmental bargaining table. At this second stage LI applies an intergovernmentalist bargaining theory in order to explain the outcome of negotiations. As the primary interest of the governments is to remain in office, they have a clear incentive to defend the national interest in the negotiation. Accordingly, ‘[t]he configuration of domestically determined national preferences defines a â€Å"bargaining space† of potentially viable agreements (Moravcsik, 1993: 496-497). The outcome of a concrete negotiation, however, not only reflects the different national preferences but also the relative bargaining power of different states. Moravcsik defines power in terms of asymmetric interdependence: ‘Bargaining leverage stems most fundamentally from asymmetries in the relative intensity of national preferences, which reflect †¦ the relative costs of agreements to remo ve negative externalities (ibid.: 1993: 499). This means that ‘[t]he power of each government is inversely proportional to the relative value that it places on an agreement (Moravcsik, 1998: 62). How, then, is the agency-structure relationship dealt with at this second stage? Or to put it differently: how much freedom does government leaders have to pursue their own preferences or ideas (agency) and how much are they constrained by their context (structure)? First, the answer to this question depends on the issue area. As mentioned, governments are severely constrained by domestic societal groups in core areas: here they can only act within a narrow â€Å"bargaining space† which limits their freedom considerably. In more marginal (non-economic) issue areas this space widens and government leaders enjoy more freedom to pursue their own agendas. Second, any particular government is constrained by the bargaining spaces of other governments. The nature of these determines the extent to which a government leader is capable of realising national interests. Finally, the outcomes of previous bargains serve as the status quo ‘with respect to which societal actors and gove rnments calculate preferences and alternatives to agreement (Moravcsik, 1995: 612). As mentioned above, the outcome of a concrete bargain reflects the relative bargaining power of each state. As bargaining power is defined in terms of asymmetric interdependence it is, in fact, derived from the very same structures as national preferences. These structures determine how attractive a potential policy is to societal groups and thus governments and consequently they also determine the relative bargaining power. Relative power is thus ultimately decided at the structural level not at the level of agents. This brings us back to the point that was raised in the previous section, namely that the rationality assumption underpinning LI does not serve to render it an agency-centred theory. To be sure, there are plenty of agents in LI, and there is no denying that the theory belongs to the tradition of â€Å"methodological individualism†. But by substituting real agents with ‘calculating machines who always know what they want and are never uncertain about the f uture and even their own stakes and interests (Risse, 2009: 147), LI effectively ends up with no notion of agency at all, at least not in its account of integration in core issue areas. That it is apparently unnecessary to study the interaction between state representatives in order to explain the outcome of a bargain tells it all: the creativity, charisma, persuasiveness and negotiating abilities of particular agents are insignificant in LI. By assuming that agents are identical in the sense of being rational it is possible to derive the outcome of bargains simply by looking at the context in which it takes place. This makes LI a structuralist theory also in its second stage. To be sure, the structuralism of LI differs from conventional structuralism inasmuch as the former retains a focus on agents and their free choices. But the point is that the â€Å"methodological individualism† of LI and other rational choice theories does not entail a genuine notion of agency in that a free choice is neither free nor, indeed, a real choice, if it is always already given by the context in which the agent operates (see also Hay, 2002: 103-104; Tsebelis, 1990: 40). (4) 5. Institutional choice Once governments have reached substantive agreement in a bargain, they set up institutional arrangements in order to secure it. At this third stage LI adopts a functional theory of institutional choice according to which governments pool or delegate authority in order to ‘constrain and control one another (Moravcsik, 1998: 9). Authority is â€Å"pooled† when governments for instance agree to take decisions in an issue area by means of qualified majority voting in the Council, whereas â€Å"delegation† refers to the transfer of authority to more or less autonomous supranational institutions (ibid.: 1998: 67). Pooling and delegation are ‘viewed as solutions to the problem of â€Å"incomplete contracting,† which arises when member governments share broad goals but find it too costly or technically impossible to specify all future contingencies involved in legislating or enforcing those goals (ibid.: 1998: 73). By pooling or delegating, the credibility of the commitment to the substantive agreement that has been reached is enhanced. But by giving up authority in an issue area governments clearly run the risk of being either outvoted by other governments (pooling) or of being overruled by supranational institutions (delegation) in future cases. Hence, ‘[t]he specific level of pooling or delegation reflects a reciprocal cost-benefit analysis: governments renounce unilateral options in order to assure that all governments will coordinate their behavior in particular ways (ibid.: 1998: 75). LI predicts that pooling and delegation will vary across issues and countries. Again, the preferences of societal groups are crucial: ‘Governments transfer sovereignty to commit other governments to accept policies favored by key domestic constituencies (ibid.: 1998: 76). As accounted for above the preferences of societal groups are seen as structurally determined, at least in the core issue area s. In the end the governments institutional choices thus become rather mechanical, following more or less automatically from the circumstances in which they are made. According to LI, international institutions are ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules (Moravcsik, 1993: 508) that for instance serve to provide states with information ‘to reduce the states uncertainty about each others future preferences and behaviour (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72). Somewhat surprisingly, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig link the existence of such institutions to â€Å"unanticipated consequences† of actions, proclaiming that LI also assumes the existence of the latter: ‘If unanticipated consequences did not exist, there would be no need for international institutions to elaborate â€Å"incomplete contracts† to begin with. The reason for institutions is precisely to elaborate agreements and credibly lock in compliance against defection by future unsatisfied governments (2009: 75). This, to be sure, is a somewhat unorthodox and problematic use of the concept. When, for instance, historical institutionalists are talking about unintended or unanticipated consequences in the context of European integration, their argument is that supranational institutions and policies tend to develop in ways not originally envisaged and subsequently not approved of by member state governments (Pierson, 1996). Due to â€Å"path dependency† and other mechanisms such institutions and the course of the integration process can become impossible for governments to control. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig clearly have something altogether different in mind when they talk about unanticipated consequences. In fact, what they are talking about can more accurately be denoted ‘anticipated but undesired outcomes. These arise when rational governments anticipate that there is a risk that other rational governments will not comply with the substantive agreement that has been reached in an intergovernmental bargain. To avoid this undesired outcome governments agree on an institutional arrangement to create certainty. On this view, institutions (being ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules) only contribute to minimise uncertainty by eliminating the risk of undesired outcomes (see also Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72) it is unthinkable that they can develop and behave in ways not intended by governments. At the end of the day, it is not unintended consequences that LI assumes the existence of but rather the ability of governments to ver y accurately predict the consequences of their substantive agreement and on this basis chose the most suitable institutional agreements. This dubious assumption can obviously only be made if it is held, as LI does, that agents are blessed with more or less perfect information, also of future outcomes of their actions (see also Pierson, 2004: 115-XXX). 6. What choice for Europe? ‘the motivations and coalitions underlying national preferences in specific decisions reflected the economic interest of sectors as predicted by their structural position in global markets †¦ any feedback must take the form of changes in economic structures, not ideas (Moravcsik, 1999b: 382) The liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of regional integration ultimately comes down to developments in economic structures and it is therefore logical and appropriate that Moravcsik (1998: 501) refers to it as a ‘structural perspective. Although the concept of â€Å"economic structures† is not defined as clearly as other LI concepts, it basically appears to denote the phenomena that economic indicators are expressions of, examples being trade flows, inflation rates, wealth and competitiveness. The method is thus to use economic indicators as expressions of the economic structures determining the preferences of agents. For instance it reads that ‘Taken together, capital mobility, trade flows, and inflationary convergence provide a prima facie explanation of the progressive shift in national preferences away from, then back toward, exchange-rate cooperation over the two decades following the collapse of the Bretton Woods. This period saw an increase in economic openness and, beginning in the late 1970s, convergence toward low inflation (Moravcsik, 1998: 48) But what caused this and other shifts in economic circumstances? What explains the timing of such shifts? Considering the enormous importance it ascribes to economic structures it would be completely reasonable to expect LI to address and tentatively provide a theoretical answer to such questions. But it doesnt! In all fairness, Moravcsik

Benefits of Human Cloning :: Clones Biology

What is cloning? "Cloning is the process of making a genetically identical organism through nonsexual means."(www.Howstuffworks.com) It has been used for thousands of years to produce plants. The next stage was to clone animals. Scientists can take unfertilized eggs of some small animals, and clone them, so they develop into full adults. After knowing that people realized how great it would be if we could clone humans. There would be a lot of advantages in cloning humans. Lets say someone will die if they can't get a heart transplant. If scientists could clone the human heart, they might be able to save that persons life. Also if they could clone a full human body, they could use the cloned bone marrow as a cure to leukemia. Scientists can also use some cloned animals organs for transplants. Or another big issue would be if you could not have a child with your husband or wife. Many couples around the world would give anything for a chance to have a child. With cloning they would be able to clone a human being that would grow up to be just like one of them. What can cloning do for you? If one of your family members was sick or dying of a disease, scientists will be able to clone them, so they will be normal again. Or maybe one of your pets needs a new liver, they can also clone one, so your pet can live. How would you like it if cloning could bring back some of the worlds most honored and respected people? For example, Albert Einstein was one of the smartest men alive. And with cloning, we could duplicate his DNA to create an exact replica of him. They could do the same for a sports legend or an award winning actor or actress. There are endless possibilities with cloning. What have we already cloned? We have cloned more than what the average person knows about. We have been cloning plants for a very long time. And we have cloned many small animals. Most people know about scientists cloning a sheep named Dolly, but what they don't know is that they have cloned many more small and large animals. They have cloned sheep, goats, cows, mice, pigs, cats, rabbits, and a gaur.

Mine pro

There are 3 doctor and 5 nurse that have been worked in this organization. Usually the operation starts on game until pm. The special of this organization is, it is open every day. This organization has been built to easier the student to make a day with a healthy health. Not only give a free treatment for student, the organization give the service for all the candidate in Tim include the worker and lecture too. Purposely to short the time and help the student to get the faster treatment so the learning schedule will not been disturb.Not only give free treatment, this organization supply medicine for those that need it for free too. The medicine did came from various of supplier because f different disease that may influence. Not because that only the medicine that have been supply are based on budget that have be limited by government. 1. 2 Organizational Chart 1. 3 Current System Description The patient and the doctor usually have to fill down all the info as manually. They have to write it in a card that have prepare for them to refill like patient card, doctor card.Medicine supplier and many more works. All of this card will be save in one cabinet that special made for it. The patient will write down their personal detail and their first date receive service provide. The actor will receive patient detail, begin the treatment and suggest the solution or the medicine should take. After that the medical section will receive receipt from the doctor, prepare the medicine and give to patience. From the medicine section work, the workers need to do all the record manually about the process of in and out the medicine.About the stock, Who are the supplier and the quantity Of the medicine too. After that the worker need to make a monthly report, so they knew the quantity and the disease that mostly affected. 1. 4 Current System Problem The patient may have more than one patient card. Take time to find patient card. The doctor may have lost the past information about the patient health problem. May lost the record about the medicine. 2. Proposed Project Overview 2. 1 Proposed System Process The patient will fill in the information into the system when they first come.

The Children’s Hour

PACE UNIVERSITY WS 296: Dealing with Difference Dr. Karla Jay Midterm Directions: Write an essay of approximately 600-800 words on two of the following questions. Lengths are suggested. Be sure to support your position with facts, details, and examples. Check your essay structure, grammar, and spelling against the checklist on Blackboard (Writing Tools). Remember to include a good opening paragraph and a conclusion! Please provide citations and a bibliography if you use outside sources.There are writing rubrics on Blackboard under the Writing Tools button. Your midterm is due March 7 at 11 p. m. (I have provided an extension. ) You will lose three points for each day your midterm is late. Your midterm will not be accepted more than a week late without a doctor’s note or other valid excuse. Follow directions for Turnitin. com. Remember that our course number is 5841197, and the password is â€Å"beebo. † (You all seem to be registered. ) Note: Please load the two essays as one file. Remember to label the file as follows: Yourname.WS269. midterm. 1. How do Willa Cather, Gertrude Stein, and Angelina Weld Grimke let lesbian readers know that they are reading a lesbian story or poem without ever using terms like â€Å"lesbian† or â€Å"third sex†? 2. Lillian Hellman said The Children’s Hour is not about lesbianism but about a â€Å"lie. † Do you agree with her? Why or why not? 3. In The Well of Loneliness, Radclyffe Hall took the position that members of the â€Å"third sex† are different from birth. Though today, some critics use different terminology and label characters like Stephen â€Å"butch,† mannish† (Esther Newton), or even â€Å"transgendered,† do you think that Hall was ahead of her time in suggesting that lesbians are biologically (essentially) different in some way? How is Stephen different from most of the other lesbians in the novel? Even Hall sees two types of lesbian. Though this e ssay allows for you to be speculative, try to ground your thoughts in some details from the novel, please. Do only one of the following questions that relate to Beebo Brinker: 4. Many lesbian novels have been banned or prosecuted for â€Å"obscenity. † Start with the trial and content of the Well of Loneliness.Then connect it to the Gathings Hearings and government concern about pulp novels like Beebo Brinker. You should consider some of the following questions: Why were they banned? Were similar non-lesbian books banned? What is the impact of banning books on lesbian readership? You MUST credit all research in the text. Please do not use Wikipedia, as it is not a reliable source. 5. What did you learn from Beebo Brinker about gay and lesbian life in Greenwich Village in the late 1950s? Don’t retell the story but use specific details of to characterize the life that people led.

5 Ways to Repair Misused Em Dashes

5 Ways to Repair Misused Em Dashes 5 Ways to Repair Misused Em Dashes 5 Ways to Repair Misused Em Dashes By Mark Nichol Em dashes are handy little items for setting phrases apart for special attention, but be cautious when employing them, because when misused, they can obscure rather than assist in comprehension: 1. â€Å"For the most part, this water comes from aquifers that’s groundwater or from surface waters that is, rivers and lakes.† When em dashes come in pairs, what lies between is a parenthetical digression that merits a more dramatic break than that indicated by a brace of commas or two parentheses. If the parenthetical phrase ends the sentence, however, only a single em dash is needed. But three or more em dashes in one sentence creates an ambivalence in the sentence structure. In this case, it’s better to use parentheses and to avoid mixing em dashes and parentheses for digressions of equal or parallel impact, use them for the second digression as well: â€Å"For the most part, this water comes from aquifers (that’s groundwater) or from surface waters (that is, rivers and lakes).† 2. â€Å"Her recent roles have shown her interest and her ability to go beyond the usual popular movie.† Be careful that when a phrase is parenthesized, what precedes and follows it is grammatically sound: â€Å"Her recent roles have shown her interest in going and her ability to go beyond the usual popular movie.† 3. â€Å"The collapses could play out in the seven states that rely on the Colorado River and its tributaries Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming as ever-increasing water use, ever-growing population and a changing climate shrink the flow.† If the parenthetical delineates a list or the parts of a whole, as here, the opening em dash should immediate follow the whole: â€Å"The collapses could play out in the seven states Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming that rely on the Colorado River and its tributaries as ever-increasing water use, ever-growing population and a changing climate shrink the flow.† (Otherwise, the sentence identifies the states as tributaries.) 4. â€Å"There may be a decrease in prices- but incomes are rising- so that outcome may not happen.† When you use an em dash, you should know what you’re getting yourself into. In this sentence, the writer meant to set off the entire second clause, not just the parenthetical, which is bereft without the phrase following the second em dash: â€Å"There may be a decrease in prices- but incomes are rising, so that outcome may not happen.† 5. â€Å"Maybe it’s just because no matter how many people have been through here the space remains the same, seemingly untouched by human hands.† By the same token, many sentences simply don’t merit even a single em dash there’s nothing to mark off for emphasis. Perhaps the writer meant to place the em dash in lieu of the comma after same, rather than the one following here, but commas suffice in both positions: â€Å"Maybe it’s just because no matter how many people have been through here, the space remains the same, seemingly untouched by human hands.† Want to improve your English in five minutes a day? Get a subscription and start receiving our writing tips and exercises daily! Keep learning! Browse the Punctuation category, check our popular posts, or choose a related post below:75 Contronyms (Words with Contradictory Meanings)15 Great Word GamesEducational vs. Educative

Point Break the Movie

Point Break the Movie Introduction Directed by Kathryn Bigelow, Point Break is a blockbuster that everyone one loves to watch but no one wants to discuss because once one starts talking about it he or she will not finish due to interruptions from people trying to explain how they enjoyed every bit of it!Advertising We will write a custom essay sample on Point Break the Movie specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Its originality coupled with thrilling scenes developed under a capriole plot makes this Point Break riveting. Not to mention John Utah’s unwitting cinematic comic actions throughout the cast which adds nothing but fun the movie. Utah comes into FBI at a time when bank robberies have become a thorn in flesh in the community. His first duty therefore, is to come up with a plan to root out the notorious Ex-Presidents gang that Pappas, despite his experience with FBI has failed to deal with. Utah infiltrates the surfing community dominated by member s of Ex-Presidents. Sure, to his plan, he manages to unearth this gang’s clandestine dealings. He comes so close to shooting Bodhi; the ringleader, unfortunately or fortunately, he manages to escape. However, this movie is ironical at some point. Irony Logic has it that, as a FBI agent, Utah is expected to investigate and unearth Ex-Presidents criminal dealings. He does this quite well. He endures a lot of pain to establish who the Ex-Presidents are. Considering Pappas proposition that members of the Ex-Presidents might be surfers, Utah volunteers to learn surfing at any cost and this is evident from the way he humbly submits to Tyler’s commands despite being a FBI agent. Eventually, he manages to befriend Bodhi, the leader of the Ex-Presidents. After a series of actions, Utah and Pappas confirm that Bodhi and the rest are members of the Ex-Presidents after seeing them case a bank. Utah and Pappas confront the gang; however, it manages to escape unscathed. This is a we ll-done FBI job. Ironically, even after this chase and confirming that Bodhi and his friends are indeed members of the Ex-Presidents, Utah agrees to join them becoming part of their skydiving team. This is ironical even ridiculous. Eventually, Utah decides to accompany the Ex-Presidents in one of their bank robberies. However, their plans crumble and Utah is left at the scene of robbery and arrested by his boss. As aforementioned, Utah is brave and he manages to unearth the Ex-President’s dealings. However, it is ironical that he decides to join them in skydiving even after getting what he wanted; that is, determining the real members of the Ex-Presidents. It would make sense if after the chase that Utah and Pappas gave Bodhi and his friends; Utah embarked on a mission to arrest them, not strengthening their friendship.Advertising Looking for essay on art and design? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Conclusion Point Break is a blockbuster with all cinematic elements that would thrill any movie lover. Utah emerges as both a hero and a villain. He manages to infiltrate the surfing community and identify members of the Ex-Presidents. However, it is ironical that, immediately after accomplishing his duty of identifying Bodhi and his friends, he decides to join them instead of busting them. McKillop notes that, Utah â€Å"was increasingly drawn to the surfers adrenaline-charged lifestyle, Bodhis philosophies, and Tyler† (Para. 4). Utah’s compromises underline the ironical aspect of this movie. Even as the movie closes down, Utah compromises yet again by letting Bodhi free and casting his FBI tag into the sea. Nevertheless, the irony in this movie is part of the thriller that Kathryn Bigelow uses to make it riveting and real. Bigelow, Kathryn. â€Å"Point Break.† JVC Entertainment Networks, 1991. McKillop, Matt. â€Å"Point Break Movie Review.† 2010. Web.  contact music.net/film/review/pointbreak

Bless Me Essay Example For Students

Bless Me Essay Bless me, Ultima Essay What is faith? Does everyone have faith? Is faith believing in something you havent seen but you think is true? All of these questions have an answer and in Bless me, Ultima by Rodolfo Anaya these questions are important. In fact, many people question their faith because they are confused about what they see or hear. In Bless me, Ultima, Rudolfo Anaya shows that on this world there are many types of faith one believes in. The author uses imagery, folklore, and dream sequences to convey the meaning of Bless me, Ultima. Anaya uses imagery to show how Christianity and witchcraft are two different beliefs, and they are in conflict with each other. The imagery provides a picture of Tonys conflict of Ultima dying. For example, When Tony was next to Ultima he knew she was going to die. As Ultima was dying, Her voice very weak, her eyes already glazed with death. 260 Anaya makes that imagery for us to see what Tony was seeing. Second, Anaya uses dream sequences to show that Tony has conflicts with himself about his beliefs. He questions his belief in this dream because he is afraid of what he might find out. In his dream Tony says, Everything I believe in was destroyed. A painful wrenching in my heart made me cry aloud, why God? my God, why have you forsaken me! 243 Tony cannot accept what is happening. Why do all good people have to die? In fact, Anaya uses folklore in this story to show that every language there is folklore about religions that believes in. Therefore, in this part it says The Agua Negra was the land of the Commanche Indians. Three Commanche raided the flock of one. So grandfather Tellez hanged them and left them strung on a tree. Now their souls wandered around the ranch. 227 This is one folklore from the story. Many are passed down from generation to generation. In conclusion, Anaya showed how Tony had many conflicts with himself about religion and beliefs. Any beliefs that one has are going to be different from someone elses. In Bless me, Ultima Rodolfo Anaya shows that this earth are many types of faiths. Yet, one has a freedom to choose ones path in life. Whether is to believe in a god or not.

The Evolutionary Changes in Construction Between the De Havilland Essay

The Evolutionary Changes in Construction Between the De Havilland Comet and the Airbus A380 Aircraft - Essay Example In addition, the jetliner also had a large square window and a pressurized fuselage. Regarding the era, the Comets provided a comfortable passenger cabin. It made its first commercial debut in 1952 where it flew without any problem. Its successful debut as a commercial jet helped drew passengers from all parts of the country with an interest in using the Comets as their preferred choice of flight. However, the success stories of the Comets did not last long since the airplane began experiencing problems just a year after its commercial service debut. In fact, three of the Comets broke up while, on flight resulting in an accident, that received wide publication by the media, according to Montagu-Pollock (2012). Investigations that followed showed that the accidents occurred due to catastrophic metal fatigue that the manufacturing engineers did not understand property at the time of its manufacturing. This prompted the withdrawal of the Comet from service after which it was taken for e xtensive testing to unearth the real cause of the accident. Investigations showed that the accident had initially been wrongly blamed on poor weather. Instead, design flaws were identified, which included dangerous installation methodology, and dangerous stresses at the corners of the windows. As a result, the Comet was modified with oval windows and structural reinforcements among many other changes, notes Nolan (2010). The other rival manufacturers of aircrafts learnt from the Comet and began making improvements in their while manufacturing processes avoid the mistakes made during the manufacture of the first Comet. Overview of the construction design of the Comet The first De Havilland Comet was made entirely of metal low-wing cantilever monoplane, observed Montagu-Pollock (2012). They had four engines, two of which were mounted below the wings for powering the plane. The two engines were buried under the wings to prevent the drag of podded engines, as well as to give room for sm aller fin and rudder. The mounting of the engines higher in the wings was also meant to reduce the risk of injection damage, which had been a major problem associated with turbine engines. It also had four-place cockpits for two pilots, navigator, and a flight engineer (Nolan 2010). Unlike the features of the aircrafts of the time, the first Comet had a clean low-drag design, which included the swept-wing leading edge, four-wheel bogies, and integral wing fuel tanks. The original De Havilland Comet measured almost the same length as the later Boeing 737-100. However, it carried fewer people in a spacious environment than the Boeing 737-100 (Birtles 1990, p.11). The British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) installed 36 reclining ‘slumber seats’ with center measuring about 45-inches allowing for a greater leg space both behind and in front. Air France, on the other hand, was fitted with 11 rows of seats plus four seats installed on its comets. The plane also had tables where passengers can have the feeling of enjoyment and comfort. Amenities included a large galley capable of serving hot and cold cuisines and drinks, according to Ron and Patterson (2010, p.19). It also had toilets for both men and women. Because of the safety concerns, the airplane had an emergency section, which included several life rafts kept in the wings, just next to the engines. However, after encountering problems while, on flight, several improvements have been made to ensure that such accidents do not occur

Sense of Self Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Sense of Self - Essay Example His mindset concentrates deep and far away from the physical world. His plight for revenge against his uncle Claudius and his mother was delayed by his mindset being deep and far away from the physical world. He relates to other characters in the play through individualism of self. What makes Hamlet so distinctive from others is how he shows himself to others with all his human flaws. Every time Hamlet wakes up, his mind was preoccupied with his own thoughts something that intensifies his feelings and perceptions in everywhere he saw imperfections, worry, tension and confusion. This situation makes it impossible for him to solve his problems easily (Lee 174-178). Hamlet’ssense of self is shown his deep thoughts where although he knew Claudius killed his father and was not a noble king like his father, he does not want to kill him because he wanted to avoid civil war. Hamlet does not wish to plunge his country with chaos because of his own personal turmoil. He realized that this would happen when he kills Claudius. He also fails to combine the spiritual (in the form of his father’s ghost) with the situations that surrounds him every day. The ghost persuades him to take revenge of his father’s death but for him being a humanitarian and taking in to account his responsibilities as a prince and future king, hamlet avoids all this pressure to kill Claudius (Taylor 206). Hamlet was a thinking man, along the play he is shown to be always thinking about the things that lay ahead of him. Unfortunately, when the time to act came, he always pulled back because of his urge to believe. His capacity to think becomes a handicap to him rather than an advantage and the most painful or tragic part is that he was aware of his weakness. In act five scene one, Hamlet looked at the bones of many of the graveyards occupants including that of the great powerful Alexander and concludes that the

My Firms Acquisition Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

My Firms Acquisition - Essay Example Large enterprises acquire smaller firms to eliminate competition and to fetch a larger market share in the industry. However, still there are many challenges in implementation of acquisition process, which seemed to be as bleak as ever. This report is an effort to look into the acquisition process to answer certain questions. The Bidding and the Target Firms As a CEO, you are trying to acquire a foreign firm. The size of your firm will double, and it will become the largest in your industry.   What does your firm do and what does the foreign firm you are trying to acquire do?   Where are the firms based? Both of the bidding and target firms are based in United Kingdom. The bidding firm is an established retail outlet and looking forward to an expansion in Asia. The firm deals in consumer durable goods including food and beverage as well as other products like technology products. The company has its maximum share in food and beverage section. The company wants to explore the Asia n market. The bidding firm has taken a calculated approach while choosing both the target market and the company in there. China has been decided to be the destination country. This was because of China’s attractive economic growth and this can be used as a base to expand the company’s business in other Asian countries. The target company is a well known local retail firm in China with a large local customer base. The target firms also deals in consumer goods like food, beverage, technology products and other such household products. However, it is expected that the acquisition will not be a smooth process. It would also require the cooperation from all the employees, the management, investors and others stakeholders of the company. It will require a strong yet flexible strategy framework to make the process proceed and at the end to make it a success. Proceeding to the Acquisition You are very enthusiastic about the opportunity to be a leading captain of industry and the associated power, prestige, and income.   (You expect your salary, bonus, and stock option to double next year).   However, you are troubled by the fact that 70% of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) reportedly fail.   How would you proceed?  Ã‚   It has been reported that since many years a considerable number of merger and acquisition efforts had failed. The success or failure of the process was due to several reasons including implementation chaos, inadequate planning, cultural difference and insufficient attention paid to the soft issues such as human resource. The bidding firm would surely follow a proper acquisition framework, fit to address most of the above issues. The following image displays the various stages in the acquisition process. Figure: Acquiring Process  ­Ã‚ ­ (Source: Hubbard, 2001, p.4) In the acquisition process, planning, communication and implementation would be dealt in full with a focus on the human issues (Pande & Krishnan, n.d., p.1-3). In the following image, the entire process has been divided in five stages. It is very much important that the bidding firm must be clear about its objectives to acquire any firm. Once decided about the objectives, the

Accounting Information Systems and Control Issues Essay

Accounting Information Systems and Control Issues - Essay Example A Control Manager warrants efficient and effective exploitation of resources in an organisation so that the planned goals are achieved. It seeks to measure the divergence of actual productivity from the benchmark performance and analyses the causes of the divergence if any and renders measures to take corrective actions. Controlling has several features: As dynamic in nature, it enhances the coordination of activities taking place in an organisation and helps in the process of planning. Internal control In the context of accounting and finance, internal control relates to a process by which the structure, the flow of task and authority, the people and the management information systems are designed in a manner so as to help an organization achieve definite goals and objectives. By this operation an organization directs monitors and measures its resources. Control plays a significant part in checking and identifying fraud and defending both physical resources like land and machinery a nd intangible resources like goodwill or intellectual property (Trenerry, p.126). The objectives of internal control in an organisation would mean delivery of reliable financial reporting, opportune feedback when operational goals are achieved and conformity with rules and regulations. At the level of a specific functional department, internal control, also referred to as operational control, refers to the means by which definite objectives are achieved. For example, all the transactions that are taking place between the company and the suppliers are should be accounted for. Internal Control system is implemented over Financial Reporting to ensure accounting statements are accurate so that the financial statements are reliable (Harrer, p.2). Revenue Control Issues in FoodRUs FoodRUs, a countrywide chain of wholesale depot, supplies to the small to medium scale shops and catering businesses. The credit terms with its customers is that if a customer has good credit records then they c an buy on account. Else they are to pay 100 % cash before taking delivery of their merchandise. The company also has an online portal through which they sell their products. The main control problem that

Porters Model Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

Porters Model - Essay Example In fact, Porters theories base on the economic situation in the eighties. This period was characterized by strong competition, cyclical developments and relatively stable market structures. Porter's models focus on the analysis of the actual situation (customers, suppliers, competitors etc) and on predictable developments (new entrants, substitutes etc). Competitive advantages develop from strengthening the own position within this Five-Forces-Framework. Hence, these models cannot explain or analyze today's dynamic In fact, digitalization, globalization and deregulation have become powerful forces during the last years, but Porter's models rarely take them into consideration. Today's markets are highly influenced by technological progress, especially in information technology. Therefore, it is not advisable - if not to say impossible - to develop a strategy solely on the basis of Porters models. Shapiro and Varian explain in their book "Information Rules"that the economical laws that apply to products and services cannot be simply transferred to the new category information good. Production, marketing etc are different for products and services and, hence, are different for information too ". Moreover, the latest shift from dot-com-hype to dot-com-crashes has given evidence that the basic laws of economics are viable for the new economy or information economy too. Even in the eighties, it was not advisable to build a strategy on nothing but Porters models. Every strategy should base on a careful analysis of all internal and external factors and on their potential future development. This is no new insight. Michael E. Porter is an economist. His Five Forces model is based on microeconomics. It just describes them in a more understandable way. Porter talks about the attractiveness of an Industry that is influenced by the shape of five forces. In economics, the constellation of factors determines issues like profit maximization or supernormal profits. Porter's Model and Micro economics Porters Five Forces Areas of Microeconomics Bargaining Power of Suppliers Supply and demand theory, cost and production theory, price elasticity Bargaining Power of Customers Supply and demand theory, customer behavior, price elasticity Rivalry between Existing Players Market structures, number of players, market size and growth rates Threat of Substitutes Substitution effects Threat of New Entrants Market entry barriers Source: Primary Michael Porters models do not have the influence they used to have any more as the economic model has changed to Internet economy in the past decade. Now with the emergence of Global companies and Dot Com companies, considering only the economic perspective for a nation's advantage or corporate strategies or the growth and development of industrial clusters is not sufficient. New economic laws came up and other drivers started to transform markets. Drivers transforming Markets beyond Porter's Model: Digitalization: As power of information technology grows, all players in a market will have access to far more information. Thus, totally new business models will emerge in which even players from outside the industry are able to vastly change the basis of competition in a market. The rise of electronic shopping malls, operated for instance by telecom operators

My Firms Acquisition Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1500 words

My Firms Acquisition - Essay Example Large enterprises acquire smaller firms to eliminate competition and to fetch a larger market share in the industry. However, still there are many challenges in implementation of acquisition process, which seemed to be as bleak as ever. This report is an effort to look into the acquisition process to answer certain questions. The Bidding and the Target Firms As a CEO, you are trying to acquire a foreign firm. The size of your firm will double, and it will become the largest in your industry.   What does your firm do and what does the foreign firm you are trying to acquire do?   Where are the firms based? Both of the bidding and target firms are based in United Kingdom. The bidding firm is an established retail outlet and looking forward to an expansion in Asia. The firm deals in consumer durable goods including food and beverage as well as other products like technology products. The company has its maximum share in food and beverage section. The company wants to explore the Asia n market. The bidding firm has taken a calculated approach while choosing both the target market and the company in there. China has been decided to be the destination country. This was because of China’s attractive economic growth and this can be used as a base to expand the company’s business in other Asian countries. The target company is a well known local retail firm in China with a large local customer base. The target firms also deals in consumer goods like food, beverage, technology products and other such household products. However, it is expected that the acquisition will not be a smooth process. It would also require the cooperation from all the employees, the management, investors and others stakeholders of the company. It will require a strong yet flexible strategy framework to make the process proceed and at the end to make it a success. Proceeding to the Acquisition You are very enthusiastic about the opportunity to be a leading captain of industry and the associated power, prestige, and income.   (You expect your salary, bonus, and stock option to double next year).   However, you are troubled by the fact that 70% of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) reportedly fail.   How would you proceed?  Ã‚   It has been reported that since many years a considerable number of merger and acquisition efforts had failed. The success or failure of the process was due to several reasons including implementation chaos, inadequate planning, cultural difference and insufficient attention paid to the soft issues such as human resource. The bidding firm would surely follow a proper acquisition framework, fit to address most of the above issues. The following image displays the various stages in the acquisition process. Figure: Acquiring Process  ­Ã‚ ­ (Source: Hubbard, 2001, p.4) In the acquisition process, planning, communication and implementation would be dealt in full with a focus on the human issues (Pande & Krishnan, n.d., p.1-3). In the following image, the entire process has been divided in five stages. It is very much important that the bidding firm must be clear about its objectives to acquire any firm. Once decided about the objectives, the

Porters Model Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2500 words

Porters Model - Essay Example In fact, Porters theories base on the economic situation in the eighties. This period was characterized by strong competition, cyclical developments and relatively stable market structures. Porter's models focus on the analysis of the actual situation (customers, suppliers, competitors etc) and on predictable developments (new entrants, substitutes etc). Competitive advantages develop from strengthening the own position within this Five-Forces-Framework. Hence, these models cannot explain or analyze today's dynamic In fact, digitalization, globalization and deregulation have become powerful forces during the last years, but Porter's models rarely take them into consideration. Today's markets are highly influenced by technological progress, especially in information technology. Therefore, it is not advisable - if not to say impossible - to develop a strategy solely on the basis of Porters models. Shapiro and Varian explain in their book "Information Rules"that the economical laws that apply to products and services cannot be simply transferred to the new category information good. Production, marketing etc are different for products and services and, hence, are different for information too ". Moreover, the latest shift from dot-com-hype to dot-com-crashes has given evidence that the basic laws of economics are viable for the new economy or information economy too. Even in the eighties, it was not advisable to build a strategy on nothing but Porters models. Every strategy should base on a careful analysis of all internal and external factors and on their potential future development. This is no new insight. Michael E. Porter is an economist. His Five Forces model is based on microeconomics. It just describes them in a more understandable way. Porter talks about the attractiveness of an Industry that is influenced by the shape of five forces. In economics, the constellation of factors determines issues like profit maximization or supernormal profits. Porter's Model and Micro economics Porters Five Forces Areas of Microeconomics Bargaining Power of Suppliers Supply and demand theory, cost and production theory, price elasticity Bargaining Power of Customers Supply and demand theory, customer behavior, price elasticity Rivalry between Existing Players Market structures, number of players, market size and growth rates Threat of Substitutes Substitution effects Threat of New Entrants Market entry barriers Source: Primary Michael Porters models do not have the influence they used to have any more as the economic model has changed to Internet economy in the past decade. Now with the emergence of Global companies and Dot Com companies, considering only the economic perspective for a nation's advantage or corporate strategies or the growth and development of industrial clusters is not sufficient. New economic laws came up and other drivers started to transform markets. Drivers transforming Markets beyond Porter's Model: Digitalization: As power of information technology grows, all players in a market will have access to far more information. Thus, totally new business models will emerge in which even players from outside the industry are able to vastly change the basis of competition in a market. The rise of electronic shopping malls, operated for instance by telecom operators

The domestic reforms of Alexander II Essay Example for Free

The domestic reforms of Alexander II Essay During Alexander IIs time on the throne he introduced many reforms that changed the face of Russia. Some historians argue that the Tsar wanted to prevent more drastic change and protect the autocracy, for example the main reform that the Tsar is remembered for, is the emancipation of the surfs. This can be seen as the single greatest liberating measure in the history of Europe and it also gave motivation to further reforms. However Alexander made a speech saying; It is better to abolish serfdom from above then to wait for the time when it begins to abolish itself from below this speech starts to question why the Tsar was really instigating the reforms, it shows that he was very aware of the feeling of unrest among the peasants, and as they made up 80% of the Russian population, the Tsar felt it would be wise to improve their situation and as a result this would strengthen Russia as a whole. This can therefore be seen as an act of the Tsar to keep control of his country and his seat in power. For that reason I feel that this shows that the main intention of this reform was to prevent any radical changes. Another reason why I feel that the emancipation of surfs was designed with the Tsars interest and fears of revolution at heart was when the serfs were freed, their landlords were given compensation for the loss of their land from the state. However the peasants were then forced to the make redemption payments to the Obshchina (community/village) over 49 years. In fact the peasants ended up with around 1/5 less land than before, due to the fact that they now had to pay for it. This showed that the Tsar did not create the reform solely for his people; he created it to help his economy and to prevent any radical change that may have been caused by an economic ruin. However some people argue that this was not his main intension in all reforms. For example they feel that the Military reforms were beneficial for the country, as it would help Russia defend itself. The Tsar divided the empire into different military districts each able to make its mobilisation more efficient. I feel that this was not a defence against radical change but in response to the resounding defeat suffered by Russia in the Crimean War (1856), and to an awareness of military advances implemented in other European countries. I also see the new judicial system that he created as a not have the prevention of change as its main intention, as I feel that it was very important for the surfs to be tried fairly which meant there was less corruption in the state. However some may see this reform as being guilty of having an underlying feeling that the Tsar was creating it so that the people were happy as they were now being tried fairly, therefore trying to prevent drastic change. However I feel that it is unfair to completely dismiss emancipation as some see it not as a reform that focused the Tsars sole desire to prevent any drastic change but as a reform that was designed to give freedom to a class that had before been denied any form of independence, to me this shows that not all reforms were designed by the Tsar to prevent drastic change. In conclusion I feel that Alexander IIs main intension in all of the reforms was to prevent more drastic change in Russia, as I feel that each of the reforms that he created have and underlying feeling that each was designed so that the autocracy benefited from it in some way, or so that there wouldnt be anything that could lead to any radical change like an revolution of some kind.

Determinants in the Process of Knowledge Transfer

Determinants in the Process of Knowledge Transfer Knowledge was closely investigated by academic researchers for the last few decades. It is nowadays considered as one of the most important strategic assets (Winter, 1987) that contribute to the competitive advantage of the firms (Kogut and Zander, 1992); this perspective is associated with the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996). Resulting from that numerous studies exist about knowledge. As Winter (1987) suggests, knowledge can be created, stored and transmitted (transferred), exploited and the ability to success in these activities represents the essence of the firm. Different studies consider these various stages. However, the process of transfer is very interesting to reflect on because it is precisely knowledge transfer that has been established by several academics as having a major impact on performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Osterloh and Frey 2000). Some literature analyzes the process of knowledge transfer itself (ODell and Grayson, 1998; Szulanski, 2000), and its determinants (Grant and Baden- Fuller, 2000), other its boundaries (Szulanski, 1996; Salk, 1996; Hennart et al. 1999; Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). Together the authors try to shed light on the stages of knowledge transfer and factors that can positively or negatively contribute to it. Despite the abundance of studies, some researchers like Wagner (2005) call for the investigation of soft issues such as absorptive capacity and culture in successful knowledge sharing. Moreover, different researchers (Inkpen, 2000; Mowery et al. 1996), studied knowledge in the context of a strategic alliance. Some studies convey the idea that this might be the most appropriate form of collaboration in order to share (transfer) knowledge because of several advantages (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). Other academics, as Simonin (1999), define difficulties that alliances face in the process of knowledge transfer. Therefore it might be useful to combine these ideas and see what makes alliances being so unique and how knowledge can be transferred in these structures. This literature review is meant to integrate various studies to make a clear picture of what makes the transfer of knowledge successful in-between partners of strategic alliance by reviewing determinants of knowledge transfer, particularities of alliances and possible strategies to follow in order to achieve the transfer. Problem statement The problem indication brings us to delimitate the following area of research: Successful knowledge transfer in a strategic alliance Research Questions Since knowledge becomes an essential asset, and its manipulation might have strong impact on the wellbeing and performance of the firm, it is interesting to investigate the knowledge transfer. Our inquiry will be done by first looking at what is knowledge and its different kinds. Then the models of knowledge transfer (in general) will be considered to see how knowledge is shared, finishing with the factors that can impact positively or negatively (barriers) on this process, this includes the soft issues sited previously. Research question 1: What are the key determinants in the process of knowledge transfer? Strategic alliances are often used by firms to transfer knowledge. Several studies might convey the idea that alliances is the most appropriate form of cooperation in order to transfer knowledge, that is why in the second research question we are going to discuss characteristics and particularities of alliances that contribute to build a solid ground for knowledge transfer. Research question 2: What characteristics and particularities of the strategic alliance might shape the process of knowledge transfer in this form of cooperation? Perhaps the most practical issue for organizations involved in the process of knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance is the one that deals with practices to implement and strategies to follow for both partners. Therefore the third research question will deal with possible behavior and ways of doing that can facilitate the knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance. Research question3: What strategies and behavior could the parties of the strategic alliance adopt  (implement) to enhance the transfer of knowledge and cope with the difficulties alliance might face? Research methods This is a descriptive research that will be done in the form of literature review. The data sources are the existing academic literature in the field of management, strategy and organization science. The literature includes top journals such as Journal of Management Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Knowledge and Process Management, Academy of Management Journal Structure of the thesis In the second chapter the investigation will be done in order to gain knowledge of what could be the determinants of the knowledge transfer in general (without considering the context of the strategic alliances). To do this, first of all, knowledge and its different kinds have to be defined. Following that the review of the literature about the process of knowledge transfer itself will be made. Chapter 2 will end with the review of possible factors that can affect the process by whether contributing to its success or by creating barriers to it. In the third chapter we are going to take a closer look on the strategic alliances. Following the definition, the discussion will pursue in order to understand why certain researchers think that strategic alliances are the most appropriate form of collaboration between firms for the process of knowledge transfer. Moreover, in this chapter we are going to look if certain characteristics of the alliance can ameliorate the transfer (i.e. firms similarities, orientation, strategy, resources). The last research question will be answered in the fourth chapter by examining the possible strategies and behaviors that companies involved in the alliance could undertake to enable a successful knowledge transfer, while they might face several challenges. At the end, conclusions will summarize this literature review bringing up possible questions for future discussion and useful recommendations about knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance. Chapter 2: The determinants in the process of knowledge transfer 1/ What is knowledge In general knowledge is considered to be gained by observation, study and experiences. It is the mixture of values, context information, expert insight (Davenport and Prusak, 1998) that resides within the person. It can be accumulated and subjected to improvements unlimited number of times. It is difficult to distinguish knowledge in itself from data and from information. Knowledge is neither of these two. Data results from transactions and information is derived from data. Fransman (1998) clearly underlines the fact that knowledge is indeed processed information. In this sense it is also possible to say that knowledge is socially constructed (Pentland 1995): individuals produce knowledge by processing information through their intellect. They act on knowledge by their actions and going through experiences, meanwhile their perspectives and insights change creating the opportunity to proceed differently in new situations, when new sets of information are available (Quinn et al. 1998; Weick 1995). 2/ Types of knowledge Another approach to introduce knowledge would be to state its different kinds: tacit and explicit. The observation of the existence of the explicit knowledge goes back to Polanyi (1966). Later the number of terms used were substantially enlarged to: formal, verbal knowledge (Corsini, 1987), declarative knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992), theoretical kind of knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), articulated or articulable knowledge (Hedlund, 1994; Winter, 1987), a know-why knowledge (Sanchez 1997). To Polanyi (1966) explicit knowledge is easily subjected to codification in a formal language (can be stated or written down). Winter (1987, p. 171) agrees on that definition by saying that this type of knowledge can be communicated from its possessor to another person in symbolic form and the recipient of the communication becomes as much in the know as the originator. Sobol and Lei (1994) identified two ways in which one can think about explicit knowledge. The first one in terms of communicability: it is easily written down, encoded, explained, or understood (Sobol and Lei, 1994, p. 170). Its also possible to think about this kind of knowledge in terms of possession: such knowledge is not specific or idiosyncratic to the firm or person possessing it (p. 170). Perhaps for this research the most interesting type of knowledge is the tacit knowledge because it is the one that largely contributes to competitive advantage of the firm. In fact, it was determined by several scholars (Delios and Beamish, 2001; Fang et al., 2007; Pisano, 1994) that tacit (as well as complex and specific) knowledge brings organizations to better-quality performance if its transfer was successfully accomplished. Also it is the type of knowledge that is considered to bring substantial competitive advantage by several academics (Nonaka, 1991; Grant, 1993; Spender, 1993). Polanyi (1966) wrote that tacit knowledge is non-verbalizable, intuitive and unarticulated. Consequently it is hard to replicate and share. Deeper understanding was brought by Nonaka (1994) and (Sternberg, 1994) who both support the fact that tacit knowledge is context-specific: it is a knowledge typically acquired on the job or in the situation where it is used (Sternberg, 1994, p. 28). Nonaka (1994) as other researchers also wrote that tacit knowledge is personal (Sanchez 1997), difficult to articulate, and highly linked with action (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Therefore, on the one hand tacit knowledge is very difficult to transfer but on the other hand this same characteristic makes it being a critical and strategic resource of the firm and its competitive advantage, because competitors can hardly replicate it (Grant,1993; Sobal and Lei, 1994). 3/ Models: How to transmit knowledge Before getting to discussion in which the transfer of knowledge involves strategic alliances, it is useful to look at the process itself. Several models attempt to explain the basics of knowledge transfer. Some of them identify key elements that play a role this process, other present stages and steps, finally some conditions are also acknowledged. In order to understand how knowledge is transferred it is possible to first look at the definitions in cognitive psychology. At the individual level, the transfer was defined as how knowledge acquired in one situation applies (or fails to apply) to another by Singley and Anderson (1989). The transfer of knowledge in the organizational context also involves transfer at the individual level because the evolution of knowledge merely occurs when individuals express the will to share their experiences and insights with others (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). This movement of knowledge through various levels of organization from individual, through group, up to organizational was identified by Nonaka (1994) as the concept of spiral of knowledge creation. The same process as on individual level occurs also at other levels such as group, department, divisionà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Here the transfer of knowledge is the process in which knowledge and experience of one unit (company, group or department) affects another. Szulanski (2000, p.10) supports this vision: Knowledge transfer is seen as a process in which an organization recreates and maintains a complex, causally ambiguous set of routines (i.e. knowledge and experiences) in a new setting (i.e. another com pany, department, divisionà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦). Knowledge transfer can be regarded as process which is composed of basic elements. Szulanski (2000) identified them as: source, channel, message, recipient, and context. Obviously, source is the unit from which the message (knowledge) will flow to the recipient by the channel and the whole process will be considered in a particular organizational context which can be fertile (facilitates knowledge transfer) or barren (problems occur with transfer). In the same research he explained several stages of the process of knowledge transfer. The process usually starts by the initiation. Then comes the implementation phase divided into several stages: the initial implementation effort, the ramp-up to satisfactory performance, and subsequent follow-through and evaluation efforts to integrate the practice with other practices of the recipient (Szulanski 2000, p.12) Furthermore, ODell and Grayson (1998) elaborated six steps in the knowledge transfer. Primary the identification of important knowledge is necessary. From this point on it is essential to collect the knowledge systematically and then organize the knowledge. When knowledge has been organized it can be shared (transferred), but before the final stage of usage of knowledge to solve problems, it has to be adapted. A number of conditions of knowledge transfer were presented by Grant and Baden-Fuller (2000). There are three main conditions of knowledge transfer. Firstly, the transmitters knowledge must be capable of being expressed in a communicable form. It is effortlessly done with explicit knowledge, however tacit knowledge has to be made explicit with the help of an expert system or be shared trough process of observation and imitation (p.122). What is more, transferred knowledge must be understandable to the source and the recipient. Therefore both have to use common knowledge which can be expressed in terms of the same language, information technology skills and culture. Finally, the new knowledge transferred from the source to recipient must be capable of aggregation which means that it would be possible to add to already existing knowledge. 4/What factors can influence the transfer of knowledge (positive and negative) Several features may play a substantial role in the process of knowledge transfer. When looking at the literature the most obvious in terms of determinants of knowledge transfer, might be the type of knowledge that is transferred. Explicit knowledge is easy to codify and to transfer. Conversely, a large number of studies, like Grant (1996), report the negative influence of knowledge tacitness on its transfer. In general it is considered that tacit knowledge is very difficult to share because of the complexity of its codification (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) and organizational embeddedness (Kogut and Zander 1992) and that it contributes to creating ambiguity which can most of the times create barriers to the process of transfer. Simonin (1999, 2004) proposed a model in which knowledge tacitness indirectly influences knowledge transfer through ambiguity; it nevertheless specifies the importance of knowledge tacitness as critical factor which makes knowledge transfer difficult. Academics like Grant (1996), Reed and DeFillippi (1990) and Zander and Kogut (1995) raise the issue of complexity of knowledge. Complexity may appear for example when different kinds of skills and wide range of knowledge (individual, team-based experiences, technologies) have to be shared. The more complex the knowledge, the more difficult it is to share. Reed and DeFillippi (1990) also considered the influence of the specificity on knowledge transfer. The term refers to knowledge which is related only to certain kind of transaction relations. Williamson (1999) defined specificity as the ease with which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without loss of productive value. From these studies it is now clear that tacitness, complexity and specificity impedes to knowledge transfer by creating ambiguity. According to Simonin (1999) tacitness has the greatest influence in this relationship, followed by specificity, which is much less significant and finally complexity. It seems that culture and willingness to share, elements often cited as factors that can influence knowledge transfer, are interrelated. Willingness to share is one of the key determinants of knowledge transfer; this means that one must be willing to share and the other one to receive. It is not always easy to let go from knowledge. As Bernstein (2000) suggests that willingness to share is influenced by identity because an individual might have a psychological ownership over the knowledge he possesses. Furthermore, Alavi and Leidner (1999) made a good remark about the fact that it will be difficult for organizations to share knowledge and integrate knowledge-based systems without primary having the information sharing culture (i.e. valuing information sharing). Davenport (1997) describes this as open versus closed culture. Very similar to the concept of willingness to share, Szulanski (1996, p.12) argued that lack of motivation also has to be considered as one of the barriers to the process of knowledge transfer because it may result in procrastination, passivity, feigned acceptance, sabotage, or outright rejection in the implementation and use of new knowledge. Szulanski (1996) also noticed another barrier of knowledge transfer. Absorptive capacity is one of the very well known elements that influence the transfer of knowledge. It is the ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge (Cohen Levinthal, 1990, p. 128) and integrate it by replacing old practices by new ones, which is not always effortless (Glaser, Abelson, Garrison, 1983). Chapter 3: Particularities of strategic alliances shaping the process of knowledge transfer Combining resources is the logical response to the harshness of nowadays competition. Other factors as the increase in customers expectations and the less strict regulatory barriers also led companies to form alliances (Gomes-Casseres 1994; Harrigan 1988; Kogut 1988; Nielsen 1988). However these are not the only possibilities alliances are able to provide. Alliances can be considered as one of the means for knowledge gaining and sharing, besides mergers and acquisitions. According to Inkpen (2000) there exist several possibilities for companies to transfer and gain knowledge: internalization within the firm, market contracts, and relational contracts. He considers individual strategic alliances as relational contracts that permit knowledge acquisition and transfer, suitable in the context where knowledge is complex and hard to codify, whereas market based transfers are considered to be more efficient for product related (embodied) knowledge. Number of other researchers also supported the fact that alliances permit firms to share knowledge and ultimately to learn from the partners (Grant, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998; Kogut, 1998). Inkpen (2000, p.1019) wrote: Through the shared execution of the alliance task, mutual interdependence and problem solving , and observation of alliance activities and outcomes, firms can learn from their partners. 1/ Definition strategic alliance In the literature it is possible to find several key characteristics of an alliance. An alliance is usually created between two or more firms that cooperate together in order to achieve some strategic objective, create value that they would not be able to achieve on their own (Borys and Jemison, 1989) and pursue a set of goals (Harrigan 1988; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). Partners are complementary and contribute with their resources and capabilities (Teece, 1992); they are involved in a range of interdependent activities (Contractor and Lorange 1988>2002) and share benefits and risks of the alliance. Dussauge et al. (2000, p.99) described an alliance between two Knowledge Based Enterprises as: an arrangement between two or more independent companies that choose to carry out a project or operate in a specific business area by co-coordinating the necessary skills and resources jointly rather than either operating alone or merging their operations. Some academics consider alliances to be arrangements in which firms establish exchange relationship without joint ownership being considered as a form of alliance (Dickson Weaver, 1997); others consider equity alliances such as joint ventures, also be a form of alliance (Mowery et al. 1996). In this research all possible forms of alliances are considered: a non-equity alliance (co-operation without creation of new organization or exchange of equity); an equity alliance (unilateral or bilateral equity holding among partners without creation of the a new firm); a joint venture (new firm is created, involving joint resources, where partners share ownership and control) 2/ Why strategic alliance can be considered (by certain researchers) the most appropriate form of collaboration for knowledge transfer? Accordingly, of all approaches to knowledge imitability between a knowledge holder and a knowledge seeker, strategic alliances constitute perhaps the most adequate, but nevertheless challenging vehicle for internalizing the others competency Simonin (1999, 595). There are several forms of interorganizational exchange that enable firms to protect valuable resources including mergers and acquisitions, licensing and alliances (Coff, 1997). There are two kinds of knowledge explicit and tacit (Polanyi, 1966), therefore if two firms share knowledge, it will be explicit explicit, explicit tacit or tacit tacit. Licensing can provide a solution for the first two combinations. Yet, it is very hard to gain competitive advantage with explicit knowledge resources, because they might be sold to other companies. By contrast, competitive advantage occurs when tacit knowledge assets are combined, provided their ambiguity, complexity and inimitability (Barney 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989). This is done through alliances or mergers and acquisitions. Conventional sale contracts, markets, mergers and acquisitions seem to be less attractive structures for knowledge transfer in comparison with alliances. Coff (1997) found that it is not easy to evaluate the value of knowledge based resources, primary because of their tacitness (Mowery, 1983; Pisano, 1990). Firms that want to acquire new knowledge will have to face uncertainty concerning its characteristics and difficulties to determine its quality and to be certain of the transferability of the knowledge held by another firm. Some researchers raise a concern about the fact that in some cases the firm that will acquire knowledge is not certain to be able to deploy it (Flamholtz and Coff 1994; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Polanyi 1966; Zander and Kogut 1995). In this sense, alliance permits to mitigate risks of bad investments. The indigestibility problem of MA, quite the opposite of alliances, was discussed by several academics (Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Dunning, 1997). Indigestible assets are those who come with valuable assets during the transaction (Nonaka 1994). In fact, for some of these assets (in this case knowledge) the aftermarket may not exist after the acquisition. Within an alliance the company does not have to pay for digestion of non-valuable assets and has access to important knowledge resources held by the partner. Reid, Bussiere, Greenaway 2001 (alliance formation issues) Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) identified some advantages of alliances related to knowledge like possibility to achieve early-mover advantage and risk spreading. Early-mover advantage signifies recombining knowledge into innovative products in a quickly advancing knowledge environment. More precisely, this means to quickly identify, access, and integrate across new knowledge combinations. In this situation strategic alliances enable company to quickly access knowledge necessary for introduction of new products to market. Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) wrote: The greater the benefits of early-mover advantage in technologically-dynamic environments, the greater the propensity for firms to establish interfirm collaborative arrangements in order to access new knowledge. A risk exists in terms that sometimes a company might be uncertain about the future knowledge requirements and knowledge acquisition and integration takes time, the investments are risky (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004): The greater the uncertainty as to the future knowledge requirements of a firms product range, the greater its propensity to engage in interfirm collaborations as a means of accessing and integrating additional knowledge. Powell (1987) also noticed that alliance formation diminishes the risk that knowledge will dissipate quickly. 3/ Which characteristics and capabilities of alliance partners can ameliorate the transfer of knowledge? Before considering the transfer of knowledge, it is important to underline, that both partners of an alliance are expected to possess valuable knowledge (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). Ahuja (2000) considered such knowledge possession as opportunity for linkage-formation. He also identified three categories of valuable knowledge assets that are: technical capital (capability to create new products, technology and processes), commercial capital (supporting resources) and social capital (useful networks). Throughout the literature it is possible to distinguish some capabilities that are important for proper functioning of the knowledge based alliance: absorptive capacity, combinative capability, experience with alliances, suitable design for knowledge exchange, and choice of alliance structure. In numerous studies, absorptive capacity plays an essential role in the process of knowledge transfer and learning within strategic alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Van den Bosch et al. (1999) wrote that it combined the evaluation, acquisition integration and commercial utilization of knowledge obtained from sources exogenous to the firm. Absorptive capacity is susceptible to evolve and augment through activity (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) because it is historical and path dependent in nature as was defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). Grant (1996) recognized that knowledge absorption capability can be influenced by: the degree to which the expert knowledge held by organizational members is utilized; the width of specialized knowledge required from firm members; the degree to which a capability can access additional knowledge and reconfigure existing knowledge. Defined by Kogut and Zander (1992) combinative capability refers to the ability of the parties of an alliance to extend, interpret, apply, current and acquired knowledge with the goal of generating new applications from existing knowledge base. Collaborative know-how affects firms ability to form a successful partnership and create a solid ground for knowledge transfer. Simonin (1997) refers to it as to ability to institutionalize organizational routines as a result of previous experiences. Pennings et al. (1994) supports that firms tend to reproduce the behavior from their past experiences. When firms have previous experiences of collaboration within alliance, they acquire knowledge that helps them to effectively design future alliances (Lyles, 1988) and develop superior capabilities at managing particular organizational forms such as alliances (Kale et al., 2002, p. 748). This experience permits avoiding various difficulties (Doz, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). Teece (2000) stressed the importance of the design of the firm to enhance performance and knowledge sharing. He identified distinctive characteristics of design in successful firms. Among these, entrepreneurial orientation and flexibility expressed in rapid responses to ephemeral market opportunities flexible boundaries (outsourcing and alliances). They were also characterized by their non-bureaucratic decision making and rapid internal knowledge sharing owing to the not really strict hierarchies. The choice of alliance structure should be determined considering the perspective of gaining valuable resources (knowledge) from a partner without losing its own (Das and Teng, 2000). Different views exist as to effectiveness of equity joint venture form of alliance for successful knowledge transfer. Several researchers find that this form is the most suitable for the transfer of tacit knowledge and complex capabilities (Kogut, 1988, Mowery et al., 1996). However, Das and Teng (2000) think that this structure is too risky for partnership based on knowledge-based contribution, and that it is more suitable for contributing property-based resources. Inkpen (2002) identifies five categories of antecedents of alliance learning: learning partner characteristics; teaching partner characteristics; knowledge characteristics; relationship factors; and alliance form. Two key characteristics of the learning partner, identified by Nielsen and Nielsen (2009), are important, namely collaborative know-how (same as previous experience of alliances) and knowledge protectiveness (Simonin, 1997, 1999). Protectiveness matches the concept of openness and the degree to which partners are protective of their knowledge. How well do the support the risk of knowledge leakage or spillover (Inkpen, 2000). Chapter 4: potential strategies and behavior that parties of the strategic alliance might adopt to enhance the transfer of knowledge and to cope with difficulties alliances might face Strategic alliances might face a number of difficulties. The first thing that comes out from the numerous literature on strategic alliance and knowledge sharing, is the fear of knowledge spillovers, that are assumed to be inevitable consequence of alliance involvement, despite the efforts companies make in order to protect their valuable knowledge assets (Inkpen, 2000). Therefore, it immediately comes to the issue of trust. In the late 90 a discussion was raised about the possibility that some firms use strategic alliance as a Trojan Horse in order to steal knowledge from its partners. This was especially thought about Japanese partners. However empirical studies do not find support for this hypothesis (Hennart et al. 1999; Mowery 1996). The literature elaborates on so called learning races (Khanna et al. 1998) when one partner (acts opportunistically) tries to gain more knowledge in the alliance exchange, than he shares. Hamel (1991, 86) described alliances as transitional devices where the primary objective was the internalization of partner skills. This creates a significant challenge for strategic alliance. To deal with with this issue, norms and systems can be designed; functional rules can be developed to structure partner engagement (QuÃÆ' ©lin, 1997). When little trust is involved, this may lead to knowledge protectiveness from one or both of the partners. Nielsen and Nielsen (2009) wrote that protectiveness not only may lead to uncertainty and conflict but it also reduces the amount of information exchanged. Determinants in the Process of Knowledge Transfer Determinants in the Process of Knowledge Transfer Knowledge was closely investigated by academic researchers for the last few decades. It is nowadays considered as one of the most important strategic assets (Winter, 1987) that contribute to the competitive advantage of the firms (Kogut and Zander, 1992); this perspective is associated with the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996). Resulting from that numerous studies exist about knowledge. As Winter (1987) suggests, knowledge can be created, stored and transmitted (transferred), exploited and the ability to success in these activities represents the essence of the firm. Different studies consider these various stages. However, the process of transfer is very interesting to reflect on because it is precisely knowledge transfer that has been established by several academics as having a major impact on performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Osterloh and Frey 2000). Some literature analyzes the process of knowledge transfer itself (ODell and Grayson, 1998; Szulanski, 2000), and its determinants (Grant and Baden- Fuller, 2000), other its boundaries (Szulanski, 1996; Salk, 1996; Hennart et al. 1999; Dyer and Hatch, 2006; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004). Together the authors try to shed light on the stages of knowledge transfer and factors that can positively or negatively contribute to it. Despite the abundance of studies, some researchers like Wagner (2005) call for the investigation of soft issues such as absorptive capacity and culture in successful knowledge sharing. Moreover, different researchers (Inkpen, 2000; Mowery et al. 1996), studied knowledge in the context of a strategic alliance. Some studies convey the idea that this might be the most appropriate form of collaboration in order to share (transfer) knowledge because of several advantages (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). Other academics, as Simonin (1999), define difficulties that alliances face in the process of knowledge transfer. Therefore it might be useful to combine these ideas and see what makes alliances being so unique and how knowledge can be transferred in these structures. This literature review is meant to integrate various studies to make a clear picture of what makes the transfer of knowledge successful in-between partners of strategic alliance by reviewing determinants of knowledge transfer, particularities of alliances and possible strategies to follow in order to achieve the transfer. Problem statement The problem indication brings us to delimitate the following area of research: Successful knowledge transfer in a strategic alliance Research Questions Since knowledge becomes an essential asset, and its manipulation might have strong impact on the wellbeing and performance of the firm, it is interesting to investigate the knowledge transfer. Our inquiry will be done by first looking at what is knowledge and its different kinds. Then the models of knowledge transfer (in general) will be considered to see how knowledge is shared, finishing with the factors that can impact positively or negatively (barriers) on this process, this includes the soft issues sited previously. Research question 1: What are the key determinants in the process of knowledge transfer? Strategic alliances are often used by firms to transfer knowledge. Several studies might convey the idea that alliances is the most appropriate form of cooperation in order to transfer knowledge, that is why in the second research question we are going to discuss characteristics and particularities of alliances that contribute to build a solid ground for knowledge transfer. Research question 2: What characteristics and particularities of the strategic alliance might shape the process of knowledge transfer in this form of cooperation? Perhaps the most practical issue for organizations involved in the process of knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance is the one that deals with practices to implement and strategies to follow for both partners. Therefore the third research question will deal with possible behavior and ways of doing that can facilitate the knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance. Research question3: What strategies and behavior could the parties of the strategic alliance adopt  (implement) to enhance the transfer of knowledge and cope with the difficulties alliance might face? Research methods This is a descriptive research that will be done in the form of literature review. The data sources are the existing academic literature in the field of management, strategy and organization science. The literature includes top journals such as Journal of Management Studies, Strategic Management Journal, Knowledge and Process Management, Academy of Management Journal Structure of the thesis In the second chapter the investigation will be done in order to gain knowledge of what could be the determinants of the knowledge transfer in general (without considering the context of the strategic alliances). To do this, first of all, knowledge and its different kinds have to be defined. Following that the review of the literature about the process of knowledge transfer itself will be made. Chapter 2 will end with the review of possible factors that can affect the process by whether contributing to its success or by creating barriers to it. In the third chapter we are going to take a closer look on the strategic alliances. Following the definition, the discussion will pursue in order to understand why certain researchers think that strategic alliances are the most appropriate form of collaboration between firms for the process of knowledge transfer. Moreover, in this chapter we are going to look if certain characteristics of the alliance can ameliorate the transfer (i.e. firms similarities, orientation, strategy, resources). The last research question will be answered in the fourth chapter by examining the possible strategies and behaviors that companies involved in the alliance could undertake to enable a successful knowledge transfer, while they might face several challenges. At the end, conclusions will summarize this literature review bringing up possible questions for future discussion and useful recommendations about knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance. Chapter 2: The determinants in the process of knowledge transfer 1/ What is knowledge In general knowledge is considered to be gained by observation, study and experiences. It is the mixture of values, context information, expert insight (Davenport and Prusak, 1998) that resides within the person. It can be accumulated and subjected to improvements unlimited number of times. It is difficult to distinguish knowledge in itself from data and from information. Knowledge is neither of these two. Data results from transactions and information is derived from data. Fransman (1998) clearly underlines the fact that knowledge is indeed processed information. In this sense it is also possible to say that knowledge is socially constructed (Pentland 1995): individuals produce knowledge by processing information through their intellect. They act on knowledge by their actions and going through experiences, meanwhile their perspectives and insights change creating the opportunity to proceed differently in new situations, when new sets of information are available (Quinn et al. 1998; Weick 1995). 2/ Types of knowledge Another approach to introduce knowledge would be to state its different kinds: tacit and explicit. The observation of the existence of the explicit knowledge goes back to Polanyi (1966). Later the number of terms used were substantially enlarged to: formal, verbal knowledge (Corsini, 1987), declarative knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992), theoretical kind of knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), articulated or articulable knowledge (Hedlund, 1994; Winter, 1987), a know-why knowledge (Sanchez 1997). To Polanyi (1966) explicit knowledge is easily subjected to codification in a formal language (can be stated or written down). Winter (1987, p. 171) agrees on that definition by saying that this type of knowledge can be communicated from its possessor to another person in symbolic form and the recipient of the communication becomes as much in the know as the originator. Sobol and Lei (1994) identified two ways in which one can think about explicit knowledge. The first one in terms of communicability: it is easily written down, encoded, explained, or understood (Sobol and Lei, 1994, p. 170). Its also possible to think about this kind of knowledge in terms of possession: such knowledge is not specific or idiosyncratic to the firm or person possessing it (p. 170). Perhaps for this research the most interesting type of knowledge is the tacit knowledge because it is the one that largely contributes to competitive advantage of the firm. In fact, it was determined by several scholars (Delios and Beamish, 2001; Fang et al., 2007; Pisano, 1994) that tacit (as well as complex and specific) knowledge brings organizations to better-quality performance if its transfer was successfully accomplished. Also it is the type of knowledge that is considered to bring substantial competitive advantage by several academics (Nonaka, 1991; Grant, 1993; Spender, 1993). Polanyi (1966) wrote that tacit knowledge is non-verbalizable, intuitive and unarticulated. Consequently it is hard to replicate and share. Deeper understanding was brought by Nonaka (1994) and (Sternberg, 1994) who both support the fact that tacit knowledge is context-specific: it is a knowledge typically acquired on the job or in the situation where it is used (Sternberg, 1994, p. 28). Nonaka (1994) as other researchers also wrote that tacit knowledge is personal (Sanchez 1997), difficult to articulate, and highly linked with action (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Therefore, on the one hand tacit knowledge is very difficult to transfer but on the other hand this same characteristic makes it being a critical and strategic resource of the firm and its competitive advantage, because competitors can hardly replicate it (Grant,1993; Sobal and Lei, 1994). 3/ Models: How to transmit knowledge Before getting to discussion in which the transfer of knowledge involves strategic alliances, it is useful to look at the process itself. Several models attempt to explain the basics of knowledge transfer. Some of them identify key elements that play a role this process, other present stages and steps, finally some conditions are also acknowledged. In order to understand how knowledge is transferred it is possible to first look at the definitions in cognitive psychology. At the individual level, the transfer was defined as how knowledge acquired in one situation applies (or fails to apply) to another by Singley and Anderson (1989). The transfer of knowledge in the organizational context also involves transfer at the individual level because the evolution of knowledge merely occurs when individuals express the will to share their experiences and insights with others (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). This movement of knowledge through various levels of organization from individual, through group, up to organizational was identified by Nonaka (1994) as the concept of spiral of knowledge creation. The same process as on individual level occurs also at other levels such as group, department, divisionà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Here the transfer of knowledge is the process in which knowledge and experience of one unit (company, group or department) affects another. Szulanski (2000, p.10) supports this vision: Knowledge transfer is seen as a process in which an organization recreates and maintains a complex, causally ambiguous set of routines (i.e. knowledge and experiences) in a new setting (i.e. another com pany, department, divisionà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦). Knowledge transfer can be regarded as process which is composed of basic elements. Szulanski (2000) identified them as: source, channel, message, recipient, and context. Obviously, source is the unit from which the message (knowledge) will flow to the recipient by the channel and the whole process will be considered in a particular organizational context which can be fertile (facilitates knowledge transfer) or barren (problems occur with transfer). In the same research he explained several stages of the process of knowledge transfer. The process usually starts by the initiation. Then comes the implementation phase divided into several stages: the initial implementation effort, the ramp-up to satisfactory performance, and subsequent follow-through and evaluation efforts to integrate the practice with other practices of the recipient (Szulanski 2000, p.12) Furthermore, ODell and Grayson (1998) elaborated six steps in the knowledge transfer. Primary the identification of important knowledge is necessary. From this point on it is essential to collect the knowledge systematically and then organize the knowledge. When knowledge has been organized it can be shared (transferred), but before the final stage of usage of knowledge to solve problems, it has to be adapted. A number of conditions of knowledge transfer were presented by Grant and Baden-Fuller (2000). There are three main conditions of knowledge transfer. Firstly, the transmitters knowledge must be capable of being expressed in a communicable form. It is effortlessly done with explicit knowledge, however tacit knowledge has to be made explicit with the help of an expert system or be shared trough process of observation and imitation (p.122). What is more, transferred knowledge must be understandable to the source and the recipient. Therefore both have to use common knowledge which can be expressed in terms of the same language, information technology skills and culture. Finally, the new knowledge transferred from the source to recipient must be capable of aggregation which means that it would be possible to add to already existing knowledge. 4/What factors can influence the transfer of knowledge (positive and negative) Several features may play a substantial role in the process of knowledge transfer. When looking at the literature the most obvious in terms of determinants of knowledge transfer, might be the type of knowledge that is transferred. Explicit knowledge is easy to codify and to transfer. Conversely, a large number of studies, like Grant (1996), report the negative influence of knowledge tacitness on its transfer. In general it is considered that tacit knowledge is very difficult to share because of the complexity of its codification (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990) and organizational embeddedness (Kogut and Zander 1992) and that it contributes to creating ambiguity which can most of the times create barriers to the process of transfer. Simonin (1999, 2004) proposed a model in which knowledge tacitness indirectly influences knowledge transfer through ambiguity; it nevertheless specifies the importance of knowledge tacitness as critical factor which makes knowledge transfer difficult. Academics like Grant (1996), Reed and DeFillippi (1990) and Zander and Kogut (1995) raise the issue of complexity of knowledge. Complexity may appear for example when different kinds of skills and wide range of knowledge (individual, team-based experiences, technologies) have to be shared. The more complex the knowledge, the more difficult it is to share. Reed and DeFillippi (1990) also considered the influence of the specificity on knowledge transfer. The term refers to knowledge which is related only to certain kind of transaction relations. Williamson (1999) defined specificity as the ease with which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without loss of productive value. From these studies it is now clear that tacitness, complexity and specificity impedes to knowledge transfer by creating ambiguity. According to Simonin (1999) tacitness has the greatest influence in this relationship, followed by specificity, which is much less significant and finally complexity. It seems that culture and willingness to share, elements often cited as factors that can influence knowledge transfer, are interrelated. Willingness to share is one of the key determinants of knowledge transfer; this means that one must be willing to share and the other one to receive. It is not always easy to let go from knowledge. As Bernstein (2000) suggests that willingness to share is influenced by identity because an individual might have a psychological ownership over the knowledge he possesses. Furthermore, Alavi and Leidner (1999) made a good remark about the fact that it will be difficult for organizations to share knowledge and integrate knowledge-based systems without primary having the information sharing culture (i.e. valuing information sharing). Davenport (1997) describes this as open versus closed culture. Very similar to the concept of willingness to share, Szulanski (1996, p.12) argued that lack of motivation also has to be considered as one of the barriers to the process of knowledge transfer because it may result in procrastination, passivity, feigned acceptance, sabotage, or outright rejection in the implementation and use of new knowledge. Szulanski (1996) also noticed another barrier of knowledge transfer. Absorptive capacity is one of the very well known elements that influence the transfer of knowledge. It is the ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge (Cohen Levinthal, 1990, p. 128) and integrate it by replacing old practices by new ones, which is not always effortless (Glaser, Abelson, Garrison, 1983). Chapter 3: Particularities of strategic alliances shaping the process of knowledge transfer Combining resources is the logical response to the harshness of nowadays competition. Other factors as the increase in customers expectations and the less strict regulatory barriers also led companies to form alliances (Gomes-Casseres 1994; Harrigan 1988; Kogut 1988; Nielsen 1988). However these are not the only possibilities alliances are able to provide. Alliances can be considered as one of the means for knowledge gaining and sharing, besides mergers and acquisitions. According to Inkpen (2000) there exist several possibilities for companies to transfer and gain knowledge: internalization within the firm, market contracts, and relational contracts. He considers individual strategic alliances as relational contracts that permit knowledge acquisition and transfer, suitable in the context where knowledge is complex and hard to codify, whereas market based transfers are considered to be more efficient for product related (embodied) knowledge. Number of other researchers also supported the fact that alliances permit firms to share knowledge and ultimately to learn from the partners (Grant, 1996; Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998; Kogut, 1998). Inkpen (2000, p.1019) wrote: Through the shared execution of the alliance task, mutual interdependence and problem solving , and observation of alliance activities and outcomes, firms can learn from their partners. 1/ Definition strategic alliance In the literature it is possible to find several key characteristics of an alliance. An alliance is usually created between two or more firms that cooperate together in order to achieve some strategic objective, create value that they would not be able to achieve on their own (Borys and Jemison, 1989) and pursue a set of goals (Harrigan 1988; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). Partners are complementary and contribute with their resources and capabilities (Teece, 1992); they are involved in a range of interdependent activities (Contractor and Lorange 1988>2002) and share benefits and risks of the alliance. Dussauge et al. (2000, p.99) described an alliance between two Knowledge Based Enterprises as: an arrangement between two or more independent companies that choose to carry out a project or operate in a specific business area by co-coordinating the necessary skills and resources jointly rather than either operating alone or merging their operations. Some academics consider alliances to be arrangements in which firms establish exchange relationship without joint ownership being considered as a form of alliance (Dickson Weaver, 1997); others consider equity alliances such as joint ventures, also be a form of alliance (Mowery et al. 1996). In this research all possible forms of alliances are considered: a non-equity alliance (co-operation without creation of new organization or exchange of equity); an equity alliance (unilateral or bilateral equity holding among partners without creation of the a new firm); a joint venture (new firm is created, involving joint resources, where partners share ownership and control) 2/ Why strategic alliance can be considered (by certain researchers) the most appropriate form of collaboration for knowledge transfer? Accordingly, of all approaches to knowledge imitability between a knowledge holder and a knowledge seeker, strategic alliances constitute perhaps the most adequate, but nevertheless challenging vehicle for internalizing the others competency Simonin (1999, 595). There are several forms of interorganizational exchange that enable firms to protect valuable resources including mergers and acquisitions, licensing and alliances (Coff, 1997). There are two kinds of knowledge explicit and tacit (Polanyi, 1966), therefore if two firms share knowledge, it will be explicit explicit, explicit tacit or tacit tacit. Licensing can provide a solution for the first two combinations. Yet, it is very hard to gain competitive advantage with explicit knowledge resources, because they might be sold to other companies. By contrast, competitive advantage occurs when tacit knowledge assets are combined, provided their ambiguity, complexity and inimitability (Barney 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989). This is done through alliances or mergers and acquisitions. Conventional sale contracts, markets, mergers and acquisitions seem to be less attractive structures for knowledge transfer in comparison with alliances. Coff (1997) found that it is not easy to evaluate the value of knowledge based resources, primary because of their tacitness (Mowery, 1983; Pisano, 1990). Firms that want to acquire new knowledge will have to face uncertainty concerning its characteristics and difficulties to determine its quality and to be certain of the transferability of the knowledge held by another firm. Some researchers raise a concern about the fact that in some cases the firm that will acquire knowledge is not certain to be able to deploy it (Flamholtz and Coff 1994; Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991; Polanyi 1966; Zander and Kogut 1995). In this sense, alliance permits to mitigate risks of bad investments. The indigestibility problem of MA, quite the opposite of alliances, was discussed by several academics (Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Dunning, 1997). Indigestible assets are those who come with valuable assets during the transaction (Nonaka 1994). In fact, for some of these assets (in this case knowledge) the aftermarket may not exist after the acquisition. Within an alliance the company does not have to pay for digestion of non-valuable assets and has access to important knowledge resources held by the partner. Reid, Bussiere, Greenaway 2001 (alliance formation issues) Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) identified some advantages of alliances related to knowledge like possibility to achieve early-mover advantage and risk spreading. Early-mover advantage signifies recombining knowledge into innovative products in a quickly advancing knowledge environment. More precisely, this means to quickly identify, access, and integrate across new knowledge combinations. In this situation strategic alliances enable company to quickly access knowledge necessary for introduction of new products to market. Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004) wrote: The greater the benefits of early-mover advantage in technologically-dynamic environments, the greater the propensity for firms to establish interfirm collaborative arrangements in order to access new knowledge. A risk exists in terms that sometimes a company might be uncertain about the future knowledge requirements and knowledge acquisition and integration takes time, the investments are risky (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004): The greater the uncertainty as to the future knowledge requirements of a firms product range, the greater its propensity to engage in interfirm collaborations as a means of accessing and integrating additional knowledge. Powell (1987) also noticed that alliance formation diminishes the risk that knowledge will dissipate quickly. 3/ Which characteristics and capabilities of alliance partners can ameliorate the transfer of knowledge? Before considering the transfer of knowledge, it is important to underline, that both partners of an alliance are expected to possess valuable knowledge (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). Ahuja (2000) considered such knowledge possession as opportunity for linkage-formation. He also identified three categories of valuable knowledge assets that are: technical capital (capability to create new products, technology and processes), commercial capital (supporting resources) and social capital (useful networks). Throughout the literature it is possible to distinguish some capabilities that are important for proper functioning of the knowledge based alliance: absorptive capacity, combinative capability, experience with alliances, suitable design for knowledge exchange, and choice of alliance structure. In numerous studies, absorptive capacity plays an essential role in the process of knowledge transfer and learning within strategic alliances (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Van den Bosch et al. (1999) wrote that it combined the evaluation, acquisition integration and commercial utilization of knowledge obtained from sources exogenous to the firm. Absorptive capacity is susceptible to evolve and augment through activity (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) because it is historical and path dependent in nature as was defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). Grant (1996) recognized that knowledge absorption capability can be influenced by: the degree to which the expert knowledge held by organizational members is utilized; the width of specialized knowledge required from firm members; the degree to which a capability can access additional knowledge and reconfigure existing knowledge. Defined by Kogut and Zander (1992) combinative capability refers to the ability of the parties of an alliance to extend, interpret, apply, current and acquired knowledge with the goal of generating new applications from existing knowledge base. Collaborative know-how affects firms ability to form a successful partnership and create a solid ground for knowledge transfer. Simonin (1997) refers to it as to ability to institutionalize organizational routines as a result of previous experiences. Pennings et al. (1994) supports that firms tend to reproduce the behavior from their past experiences. When firms have previous experiences of collaboration within alliance, they acquire knowledge that helps them to effectively design future alliances (Lyles, 1988) and develop superior capabilities at managing particular organizational forms such as alliances (Kale et al., 2002, p. 748). This experience permits avoiding various difficulties (Doz, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). Teece (2000) stressed the importance of the design of the firm to enhance performance and knowledge sharing. He identified distinctive characteristics of design in successful firms. Among these, entrepreneurial orientation and flexibility expressed in rapid responses to ephemeral market opportunities flexible boundaries (outsourcing and alliances). They were also characterized by their non-bureaucratic decision making and rapid internal knowledge sharing owing to the not really strict hierarchies. The choice of alliance structure should be determined considering the perspective of gaining valuable resources (knowledge) from a partner without losing its own (Das and Teng, 2000). Different views exist as to effectiveness of equity joint venture form of alliance for successful knowledge transfer. Several researchers find that this form is the most suitable for the transfer of tacit knowledge and complex capabilities (Kogut, 1988, Mowery et al., 1996). However, Das and Teng (2000) think that this structure is too risky for partnership based on knowledge-based contribution, and that it is more suitable for contributing property-based resources. Inkpen (2002) identifies five categories of antecedents of alliance learning: learning partner characteristics; teaching partner characteristics; knowledge characteristics; relationship factors; and alliance form. Two key characteristics of the learning partner, identified by Nielsen and Nielsen (2009), are important, namely collaborative know-how (same as previous experience of alliances) and knowledge protectiveness (Simonin, 1997, 1999). Protectiveness matches the concept of openness and the degree to which partners are protective of their knowledge. How well do the support the risk of knowledge leakage or spillover (Inkpen, 2000). Chapter 4: potential strategies and behavior that parties of the strategic alliance might adopt to enhance the transfer of knowledge and to cope with difficulties alliances might face Strategic alliances might face a number of difficulties. The first thing that comes out from the numerous literature on strategic alliance and knowledge sharing, is the fear of knowledge spillovers, that are assumed to be inevitable consequence of alliance involvement, despite the efforts companies make in order to protect their valuable knowledge assets (Inkpen, 2000). Therefore, it immediately comes to the issue of trust. In the late 90 a discussion was raised about the possibility that some firms use strategic alliance as a Trojan Horse in order to steal knowledge from its partners. This was especially thought about Japanese partners. However empirical studies do not find support for this hypothesis (Hennart et al. 1999; Mowery 1996). The literature elaborates on so called learning races (Khanna et al. 1998) when one partner (acts opportunistically) tries to gain more knowledge in the alliance exchange, than he shares. Hamel (1991, 86) described alliances as transitional devices where the primary objective was the internalization of partner skills. This creates a significant challenge for strategic alliance. To deal with with this issue, norms and systems can be designed; functional rules can be developed to structure partner engagement (QuÃÆ' ©lin, 1997). When little trust is involved, this may lead to knowledge protectiveness from one or both of the partners. Nielsen and Nielsen (2009) wrote that protectiveness not only may lead to uncertainty and conflict but it also reduces the amount of information exchanged.